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Abstract
Many of the U.S. railroads have introduced highly differentiated services for grain
shipments in recent years, generally in the area of forward guaranteed car service.  Taken
together with other alternatives, these mechanisms have had the effect of establishing priority
allocations among shippers.  In most cases, pricing and allocation of these services has been with
some type of bidding mechanisms.  This paper explores the economic implications of these
mechanisms on the grain shipping industry.  A model was developed to identify factors affecting
the value of these services and was analyzed in the context of a typical midwestern grain
shipment.  A game theory model of competitive bidding was also developed to analyze the
effects of critical strategic variables on equilibrium outcomes.
Key Words: railcars, guaranteed car service, railcar allocation, options, guarantee, bidding
models, valuationProfessor and research scientist, respectively, in the Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota
*
State University, Fargo.
See Priewe and Wilson (1997b) for a detailed description of these mechanisms.
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Problems related to car allocation and railcar shortages are not new and have been discussed in Apogee;
2
Baumel and Kober; Baumel and VanDerCamp; Gelston and Greene; Moser; Niedens; J. Norton; Pautch, Lapan, and
Baumel; Pedraza; and W. Wilson. 
Bidding on Railcars for Grain: A Strategic Analysis
William W. Wilson, Bruce L. Dahl
*
Due in part to deregulation since the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, U.S. railroads have
introduced various pricing innovations during the past decade.  In early years, these were unit
train discounts and confidential contracts.  Since the late 1980s, of particular importance has
been the advent of railcar offerings up to 5-6 months forward for guaranteed car placements. 
Taken together, the combination of  alternatives has the effect of ascribing priorities among
shippers.  While these dimensions of service and pricing are common in many other service
industries (e.g., airlines, hotels, restaurants), programs entailing forward guarantees in grain
shipping are innovative and have had important implications for the conduct of firms in the grain
marketing industries.  In addition, their legality was challenged, but the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) ultimately ruled in their favor and, in fact, encouraged other railroads to
consider these mechanisms for solving car allocation problems.   
Before the late 1980s, the predominant form of railcar allocation to grain shippers was
some form of first-order-first-serve process as defined in railroad tariffs.  Cancellation penalties
were not used, resulting in phantom orders, thereby causing uncertainty in making rail operations
and capacity decisions.  The Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) was the innovator in this pricing
mechanism with the introduction of its COT (Certificate of Transport) program in 1988. 
Important features of that program include forward car offerings to shippers for a portion of their
fleet, prepayment fees used as cancellation penalties, and guarantees provided by the BN for
prescribed delivery windows.   Cars are allocated among shippers using an auction process, and
transferable certificates are issued.  The COT program has had the effect of establishing priorities
among shippers for the allocation of railcars.     Generally, shippers opposed allocation of railcars
1
using price and “preferred that all service be allocated via a non-price method during shortage
periods” (ICC, p. 458).   In an industry where notions of equitable distribution and common
2
carriage were somewhat nebulous in the post-Staggers period, these innovations were challenged
by shippers under the Interstate Commerce Act.  Ultimately, the ICC decided in favor of the BN,
indicating that “allocation by price is efficient because service is provided to those who value it
most” (ICC p. 459) and that COTs should “enhance long-run efficiency by giving incentives to
maintain an optimally sized grain car fleet.”
Since that decision, many other railroads have introduced similar mechanisms.  The
CP/Soo introduced the PERX  program in its wheat lines.  The Union Pacific (UP) had
previously adopted its ACOS system (Advanced Car Order System) under which a portion of
cars were allocated based on historical shipments.  This was subsequently replaced with a
comprehensive car allocation system, including “Vouchers” for guaranteed forward shipments. See Priewe and Wilson (1997b) for a description.
3
See Priewe and Wilson (1997a) for an analysis of alternative strategies.  
4
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Similar mechanisms have also been introduced by the Illinois Central.  Allocation of each of
these is through bidding among shippers.  Canadian railroads are experiencing similar problems
in the post-WGTA period.  Under the previous regulatory scheme, cars were allocated through
the Grain Transport Authority (an industry/committee process), using a labyrinth of rules, and
were based on historical shipments.  This was abandoned in 1996 and replaced by another
industry consensus group, CAPG (Car Allocation Policy Group) using similar procedures,  until
a longer-term strategy is agreed upon.     
This evolution has important implications for both carriers and shippers.   To adopt these
mechanisms, railroads must make critical decisions about the mechanism design which
ultimately affects the structure of bidding competition.  In addition, combined with car allocation
mechanisms for other service categories (e.g., SWAPS, GEEPS, Pool Cars, etc., as well as the
mechanism for distribution of general tariff cars),  these comprise a system of service options
3
each railway offers shippers.  Ultimately, an important element of competition among carriers is
captured in these service options.  For shippers, efficient use of these mechanisms requires
greater integration between grain merchandising and logistics to exploit these efficiencies.  
4
Shippers also must assess effects of critical variables to develop strategies for bidding on rail
cars. 
Bidding competition is not alien to the grain marketing industry.  Two important
functions provided through bidding processes are pricing and allocation.  Transaction prices are
established through bidding, and allocations are made among market participants.   Auctions are
particularly appealing when there are informational asymmetries between the seller and potential
bidders.  Because of the efficiency of bidding competition in fulfilling these roles, it is used in
numerous commodities, products, and services in the agricultural marketing system.
 There is extensive literature in general economics on the appeal of auctioning
mechanisms.  Cassady provides a historical overview of auction strategies and mechanisms. 
Several bibliographies [McAfee and McMillan (1986, 1987, 1996b); Engelbrecht-Wiggans;
Milgrom (1985, 1987, 1989); Rothkopf and Harstad; Milgrom and Weber; Riley and Samuelson;
Vickery; R. Wilson (1992)] review the literature on auctions and bidding strategies.  Texts
(including Monroe, Nagle and Holden, Lilien and Kotler, Rasmussen, and Kottas and
Khumawata) provide some practical motivations for auctions and analytical approaches to
bidding strategies.  Game theory concepts have been used to design competitive bidding
mechanisms for auctioning numerous items and services, including OCS oil leases (Reece) to
spectrum licenses (R. Norton, McAfee and McMillan 1996a), electric power and industrial
chemicals (Chao and Wilson 1995), and airwaves (Crampton, The Economist).  Without the use
of auctions, other forms of pricing (e.g., negotiation, posted prices) and allocation would have to
be used. 
There are several important questions about the execution of bidding programs in the case
of rail auctions of forward guaranteed freight.  Of particular interest are 1)  the effect of theThis form of efficiency was referred to by the Interstate Commerce Commission in reference to Kalt’s
5
expert witness testimony. 
For example, in power generation, the value of uninterrupted service for a hospital is greater than
6
residential air conditioning or agricultural irrigation.  Thus, during periods of excess demand, it would be efficient
to interrupt service to the latter two-market segments first.  Random rationing would impose greater costs on the
former.  See R. Wilson 1993 (Chapter 10) for complete development of the priority pricing problem.
3
number of bidders on bidding competition,  2) identification of  competitors’ bidding strategies,
3) determination of optimal bids,  and 4) how information revealed to bidders affects bidding
competition.  These questions are frequently raised by market participants and have not been
addressed in the agricultural economics literature.
This paper analyzed the strategic implications of forward railcar auctions.  The first
section discusses relevant concepts of efficiency.  The second section develops an analytical
model to demonstrate the effect of critical variables on the value of forward car guarantees.  The
third section develops a strategic model of bidding and applies it to the railcar problem.  Effects
of critical variables affecting equilibrium strategies are demonstrated.  The final section provides
a summary and implications for both shippers and carriers.  
Efficiency and Railcar Allocation Mechanisms
We focus on two forms of efficiency:  distributional and pricing.    
Distributional Efficiency
5
In the context of pricing unstorable services (e.g., electric power or transport), efficiency
requires that service is deferred for those customers who would incur the least cost.  Thus, an
efficient rationing (allocation)  is one in which the resource is allocated according to customer
valuation.  Simply put, an allocation is efficient if the order of service corresponds with the value
of the service across customers.   In the case of railcar allocation among grain shippers, an
6
efficient allocation would be one in which those with the greatest value would receive cars first. 
For example, a shipper with an export commitment in which a large demurrage cost would be
incurred if the shipment is received late should receive priority in car allocation relative to one
simply shipping from one storage facility to another for storage.  Allocation would be inefficient
if the latter received cars before the former.  If their values are sufficiently different, arbitrage
could occur with the latter selling to the former and profiting due to their differences.
Priority pricing schemes are being increasingly used to more rationally serve competing
demands with fixed capacity (R. Wilson, 1993, pp. 236-258).  Priority pricing improves
efficiency by serving customers in the order that conforms with the cost (implicit or direct)
incurred from the shortage or deferral, vis-a-vis random rationing, and is being implemented in
numerous applications from public utilities (Pricing Strategy Associates) to the internet.  
Previous research has shown that priority service pricing is superior to random rationing on
efficiency grounds (R. Wilson, 1993).  It is highly unlikely that allocation using historical4
shipments would be efficient. The only way historical allocation would be efficient would be if
the same shippers had a high value of guaranteed service continually through time.
One of the benefits of priority pricing is purely informational.  By having different prices
associated with different service priorities, information on the value of capacity increments that
improve reliability is derived.  This indicates shipper willingness to pay for capacity increments
that are unavailable in undifferentiated services.  Given the signals generated in a priority pricing
mechanism, railroads can improve capacity and operating decisions which influence car-
placement timeliness.
Pricing Efficiency
In grain transportation, it is important to devise a mechanism for setting priorities due to
the volatility in demand and car shortages and surpluses.  Car allocation problems are also
compounded by inversions in the commodities market and, in some cases,  is exacerbated
because of ordering and allocation procedures.  In each case, the railroad is fraught with
allocation decisions and how to establish priorities.  Transmission of signals regarding the value
of marginal capacity or improved operating efficiency to railroad management has been limited.
Pricing plays two important roles in car allocation.  One is to induce shipper self-
selection. By offering alternatives regarding guarantees, forward car ordering, priority allocation,
and rates, shippers would choose the option that yields them the greatest payoffs (or minimizes
their expected total cost). Without alternatives, shippers would be forced to accept allocations
which may not be best from their perspective.
The second role is to design a mechanism so information about the value of guaranteed
services is received by the carrier.  This can be achieved either through some form of bidding
competition or through innovations in tariffs.  At the extreme, rates could be determined on a
"spot" basis and change whenever there was a change in market fundamentals (i.e., reflected in
equation 1.5 below).  Using bidding competition, this would assure that shippers with the
greatest demand for priority would receive cars which would result in a superior allocation
relative to any form of random rationing or use of historical averages.  
Spot rates, which are revised continuously, would result in immense uncertainty for
shippers and carriers.  Furthermore, the disadvantage of spot pricing is that the railroad would not
receive information which could be used to make future capacity adjustments.  The alternative is
some form of a forward contracting or bidding mechanism.  Signals transmitted in forward bids
for shipping services could be used to improve allocation decisions, whereas a spot market is
merely a rationing mechanism.  Priewe and Wilson (1997a) develop a stochastic simulation model of a shipper to analyze the risks and
7
payoffs associated with this and other shipping mechanisms.
This approach is potentially limiting since we are analyzing payoffs of individual transactions.  In
8
practice, shippers with multi-plant operations (or management agreements) have advantages in using these
instruments.  This is due primarily to uncertainty in shipping demand for an individual shipping station and the
ability of shifting origins.  These features of the analysis could be incorporated here, but the results would be
complicated. 
Wilson (1989) demonstrates a more general formulation including alternative markets and modes.  In that
9
case, the conditions under which premiums could be negative are illustrated.  Here, the distinction is not important,
and therefore the more simplified formulation is presented.
This is simplifying only.
10
5
Factors Determining the Value of Guaranteed (Forward) Car Service (GFCS)
It is important to understand the sources of value and the logic of the market functions
and interrelationships which give rise to GFCS’s having value.   In this section, we provide a
7
simple model to identify the value of GFCSs to shippers.  The value of GFCSs to shippers
involves a myriad of factors, each of which has an impact on shippers’ profits.  First, we describe
the setting under which shippers (grain merchandisers) make decisions, outlining the various
options of the decision.  Then we frame the decisions, identifying the payoffs associated with
different decisions.  Finally, we illustrate the process and comparative statics using data from the
Northern Plains to the Pacific Northwest ports.    
Model Formulation
There are two important features of a GFCS from a grain merchandising perspective. 
First, it provides a mechanism to lock in rates and, therefore, shipping costs and margins,  for a
particular movement.  Second is that guarantees are provided for car supply.  As a result, risks
associated with transport are reduced.  GFCS has value primarily due to these features.  Because
fundamental factors determining value vary, the value of GFCS varies through time and
potentially across shippers.  
A general model is developed to demonstrate the impact of factors which influence GFCS
values.  A payoff function of a merchandiser for an individual transaction is the basic analytical
tool.    To illustrate decisions associated with GFCS, we develop a simple model to explain
8
payoffs associated with alternatives.  In this model, all shipments are assumed to occur one
period forward, i.e., in time t+1, and the unit of time in all calculations is one-half month to
coincide with industry practices using First-Half/Last-Half shipping windows for each month.   If
shippers do not receive cars on the want date, it is assumed they will be received 1 period (15
days) later and would incur additional storage and interest costs.  Demurrage costs are incurred if
cars are not received on the want date.  Finally, we assume there are no alternative markets or
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Following are definitions used in the model:
% trader's margin on a GFCS (guaranteed) transaction
g
% trader's margin on a transaction, without a guarantee
N
P commodity price at the destination market j, and t+k indicates k time periods j
t+k
     forward
P commodity price at origin i at time t i
t
T tariff rate fore shipping from i to j using a traditional allocation mechanism ij
T price (value) of a GFCS ij
g
r interest cost
S storage (physical) cost
D cost of demurrage 
R probability of receiving cars on the want date, t,  and (1-R )  is the probability of  1 1
     receiving cars during the next period
Payoff functions for individual decision makers are defined first using a GFCS and then for a
non-GFCS shipping position.
The payoff for a transaction using a GFCS is
1.1)
Manipulation yields the following which indicates the value of T  :  ij
g
1.2)
  For a non-GFCS transaction, or market in which a GFCS does not exist, the equivalent
payoff function includes the risk of not receiving cars (1-R ).  This payoff function includes a 1
margin if cars are not received on their want date, implying they are received during the next
period.  The payoff function is
1.3)
Manipulation yields the following expected payoff for a transaction in which GFCS does not
exist, or is not used:
1.4)
The value of a GFCS can be defined as  .  Rearranging and combining equations, the
value of a GCS can be defined as:
1.5)   
These results indicate that the value of GFCS increases with 1)  increases in the
probability of not receiving cars on the want date (1-R );  2) increases in the price spread,     1
(P -P ); 3) increases in time-dependent storage costs (r + S + D);  and 4) increases with the jj
t+1 t+2
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See Priewe and Wilson (1997a) for a procedure to determine the probability that tariff rates would
11
increase.
In the COTs case, the ICC recognized that part of the reasons for the market inversions during the late
12
1980s was due to the administration of the EEP program which generally was for subsidized sales in more nearby
shipping periods, relative to deferred.
7
Implications
Factors influencing  the value of GFCS include intermonth price spreads in the
commodity market, costs associated with not receiving cars (additional storage and interest and
demurrage), and the probability of timely car placement under traditional (or alternative)
allocation mechanisms.  Values of GFCS are determined by these factors.
Demand for GFCS.  There are two sources of demand for GFCS.  One of these is the
speculative demand.  Demand may exist for GFCS if rates for tariff movements are expected to
increase.   This may be interpreted by rearranging equation 1.5.
11
   1.6)
If traders expect increases in rates for tariff movements, the value of  GFCS would increase as a
means for protection. This is an important feature in the evolution of COTs and PERX.  Under
the Staggers Rail Act,  there can be increases in tariffs of these underlying movements with a 20-
day notice, a period shorter than the duration of most contracts. 
Hedging demand comprises the other element of demand for GFCS and refers to the
service protection it confers to shippers.  These are related to the factors included in equation 1.5. 
Most important is the probability of not receiving cars on the want date relative to the commodity
market inversion (in part due to the Export Enhancement Program, EEP),  giving premiums for
12
guaranteed nearby shipment.
Shipping Versus Storage Demand.  An important element determining the temporal
demand for shipping is the demand for storage.  Shippers evaluate alternative returns associated
with shipping during different periods.  Factors determining these returns are the intermonth
price spread in the commodity market, storage costs and shipping rates.  In a normal commodity
market, positive price spreads exist between consecutive shipping months.  These are typically
large enough relative to storage costs to provide an incentive to store the commodity between
months.  Negative intermonth price differentials exist in inverted markets.  In an inverted market
(reflecting some type of shortage situation in the nearby months relative to the deferred), shippers
would have a positive value for guaranteed cars for nearby shipments.  Of course, the extent that
the premium for transport (shipping costs) increases for nearby shipments, the shipper's return
would be reduced, potentially to the point of indifference between shipping months.  This is an
important feature of GFCS because it has the effect of evening out the inter-temporal demand for
shipping (See Priewe and Wilson, 1997a).  
There has been substantial variability in the premium both through time and across
shippers (see Priewe and Wilson, 1997b).  The model used here demonstrates numerous reasonsBased on $15,000 US per day for a 50,000 mt vessel.  Value shown is for 15 days.
13
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to expect the value for GFCS to vary both through time and across shippers.  It is expected that
the intermonth price spread and storage and interest costs would be nearly identical across
shippers.  However, the value of potential demurrage costs and individual shippers’ expectations
of timely receipt of cars (R ) vary across shippers.  This is no doubt the case in the United States 1 
and is what has caused shippers to have different bids (and therefore values) for guaranteed
transport.
Comparative Statics
To demonstrate the influence of these variables on the value of a GFCS, representative
data were assembled for wheat shipments from the Northern Plains to the Pacific Northwest
ports.  These are used to define the base case from which critical variables are varied to
demonstrate their effect on the value of GFCS.  Table 1.1 lists values used in the base case. 
Values for R  are hypothetical.  All other values are intended to reflect conditions in the early 1
1990s.
Table 1.1.  Base Case Variable to Illustrate Values of GFCS
 cents/bushel
PNW FOB
Nov 2nd half (P ) c/b 591
t+1
j




Shipping and Handling Costs
Tariff (T ) c/b 100 ij
Handling Tariffs c/b 8
Margins ( %   =  %  ) c/b 2
GN
Ship Demurrage (D)    c/b 12.25
13
Storage Costs
  Storage  c/b/month 3
  Storage  c/b/15 days 1.5
  Interest c/15 days  1.43
Rail Cars
Prob. of Receiving Cars (R ) .7 1


























































Figure 1.1.   Value of Guarantee Premium: by Probability of Receiving Cars for Selected
Interperiod Price Spreads (P(t+1)-P(t+2) (c/b)).
Based on equation 1.5,  the value of a GFCS would be $140.34 per railcar using the base
case values.  In each case, the simulation is made relative to the base case.  These are illustrated
in Figures 1.1-1.2.  Results indicate
• The value of a GFCS increases with the probability of not receiving cars on the want date
under alternative allocations.  If this probability is zero, GFCS has no value, i.e., if the
probability of receiving cars on the want date is 1.0, then the value of a GFCS is nil.  As
the probability of not receiving cars increases (to 1.0), the value of GFCS increases.
• The value of GFCS decreases with the price spread between the nearby and deferred
shipping period.  Results illustrate that as the nearby increases relative to the deferred
shipping period (i.e., an inversion), the value of GFCS during the first period increases. 
Literally, as nearby shipping periods command a premium (i.e., an inversion), the value
of GFCS during that period increases.  The reason for this is that the discount for
receiving grain during the deferred period acts as  a penalty to the shipper.  If the price
spread exceeds +8c/b, the value of GFCS diminishes because of forgone earnings from
storage.  
• The value of GFCS increases with increases in demurrage costs.  In this case, if total
demurrage costs (per 50,000 mt vessel) are $2,000 per day, the value of GFCS is $35.26










































Figure 1.2.   Value of Guarantee Premium: Total Demurrage Cost.
Strategic Analysis of Bidding 
A crucial aspect of these mechanisms is that allocation and premium are determined
using  bidding.  This is in contrast to using either tariffs or negotiation for pricing or for using
historical averages, administrative, or some form of random rationing mechanism for allocation. 
Bidding, as a mechanism of price determination and allocation among competing shippers, has
numerous attractive features and important strategic implications.   Game theory models of
auctions (e.g., Rasmussen) can be used to analyze strategies of all players simultaneously.  The
thrust of game theory analyses is on the equilibrium strategies of all bidders and the game
outcome and, as such, is useful for analyzing auction rules and revenue equivalency (Vickery).    
 This section identifies some of the critical aspects of auctions and competitive bidding
related to the car allocation problem.  A game theoretic model was developed and used to
simulate an auction to identify effects of critical parameters.  Likely values as they pertain to this
problem are used for illustration purposes.
Problem and Auction Types  
Since the value of the item, in this case, guaranteed car service for a forward shipping
month, is unknown to the railroads, it is unlikely that a posted price would accurately reflect the
value.  Bidding competition has the effect of forcing shippers to reveal their valuations of
forward guaranteed shipping service.  Further, the railroad does not know which shipper(s) have
the highest value for forward guaranteed car service.  An auction has the effect of revealing%i 
 ˆ Vi 	 bi ˆ Vi
A first-price, sealed-bid auction is an efficient pricing mechanism and is equivalent to a Dutch auction
14
(see Milgrom, 1987, for discussion).  In both cases, goods are allocated at a price equal to the bid.  These have the
same "reduced normal form" and, therefore, lead to identical strategies and outcomes.  In an English auction, the
bidder with the highest value receives the product,  but only at the second lowest price.
11
which shipper(s) have the greatest value.  Thus, the crucial effect of auctioning is that  shippers
are forced to reveal their values and that an optimal allocation and price is nearly automatically
achieved.  
There are numerous types of auctions, including ascending and descending oral bid
auctions and first and second priced sealed bid auctions.  In general, these yield similar results
from a revenue perspective (Milgrom and Weber, Riley and Samuelson).   For practical
14
purposes, the sealed bid auction is used.  The important feature of a sealed bid auction is that a
shipper bids without knowing the competitors’ values, and no opportunity exists for updating the
information (as compared to an English ascending bid auction).  Thus, shippers are forced to
make their own valuations of the GFCS and to formulate expectations about how their
competitors bid.  It is critical that the competitive environment forces shippers to bid
independently.  If not, an auctioning process would not be an attractive alternative and/or a
reservation price becomes essential (McAfee and McMillan 1987).
As long as their value V  exceeds that of their competitors, V , the optimal bid is just bc
slightly above that of their competitors, V +, where  is an infinitesimally small value.  c
However, not knowing the value of their competitor's bids forces a strategic approach to bidding.
Bidding Models
A first-price, sealed-bid auction among grain traders or shippers was developed.  Bidders
(players) are grain shippers who compete in their bidding for GFCS, submitting their bids to the
auctioneer which is the railroad.  
There are two critical functions confronting bidders in bidding competition:  first, a profit
function, defined as   where   is the expected value of the GFCS for bidder i and 
b is the amount bid.  The second is the probability of winning, denoted Prob(b), which depends i i
on the amount bid,  b,  and on the intensity of bidding competition.  The latter is largely related i
to the number of bidders bidding in a particular auction.  Combining these two functions results
in an expected payoff, E(%).  An optimal bid is defined as that bid which yields the maximum i
expected payoff, considering the tradeoff between higher profits associated with low bids and the
lower probability of winning associated  with low bids.  Technically, the product of these two
functions is maximized with respect to  b to derive the optimal bid.  Each bidder maximizes i
expected profit simultaneously. The solution is solved through an iterative process and the results
used to determine the optimal bid for each player.
In sealed bid auctions, each bidder bids simultaneously, without knowledge of competitor
bids.  They do, however,  form expectations about competitors’ bids.  Competitors’ bids depend
on two sets of variables.  One is the statistical distribution of valuations, V .  Assuming bidders i
have different values of GFCS, then the distribution, represented by a standard deviation (i.e.,E( % i ) 
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Preszler, Wilson, and Johnson developed a similar model for analyzing price transparency and export
15
wheat tendering.  
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derived across values of individual bidders), becomes important.  The other set of variables is
competitive factors and largely consists of two components.  One is the number of bidders (N) in
a particular auction; the other is the information possessed by bidders at the time of the auction.
Bidders evaluate their competitive positions and use this information to formulate bids to
maximize expected profit.  Specifically, distributions reflect players' beliefs about each other's
valuations of GFCS  which are assumed to have a normal distribution.  The expected value and
standard deviation of these values are denoted µ  and ), respectively, for the i  player. ii
th
Mean value for player i (µ ) is determined by a formulation similar to equation 1.5.  The i
standard deviation is a measure of the "quality" of information given that each player has some
uncertainty about his/her and his/her competitor’s values.  Each player moves once.  Strategies
available to the players are a continuous set of bids (b), expressed as a multiple (s) of the ii
player's value, V.  Thus, player i's bid is b = s * V.   By assumption, players commit themselves ii i i
to a strategy s before V becomes known to player i, i.e., before nature makes its move.  Because ii
bids are a preselected multiple of V (which are unobserved by opponents), they are random.
Player i seeks to maximize the expected payoff:
15
2.1)  
where (V - b) represents the payoff from a winning bid and Prob(b) denotes the probability of ii i
winning.  By virtue of our assumptions about V and "preselection" of strategies, opponents’ bids
are normally distributed.  Let b  denote the bid of an arbitrary opponent, and let µb  and )b -i -i -i
denote (respectively) the mean and standard deviation of that bid.  If there are n players whose
valuations are distributed independently, the probability that player i will win is given by
2.2)
The probability of underbidding n-1 opponents is the product of the probabilities of underbidding
each individually.
The expected payoff for player i is (implicitly) a function of all players' strategies.  Let s-i
represent a vector of opponents' strategies; taking these as given, the "best response" for player i




When all players adopt "best responses" to their opponents' strategies (and players' expectations
are mutually consistent), a Nash equilibrium is attained.  In a Nash equilibrium, no player has anThe model was developed and solved using MathCad.
16
The probabilities are each player’s assessment of his probability of winning versus not winning
17
and containing his assessment of expected valuations of competitors.  Other players, not knowing their
rival’s valuations, only have a probabilistic assessment of their chance of winning/not winning.  As such,
these probabilities are conditional probabilities based on the information set available to each competitor
and are not additive.  Ioannou demonstrates the logic of this conclusion. 




incentive to deviate from his/her chosen strategy.  For the simulations presented in this analysis,
Nash solutions were identified through a numerical search procedure.
16
Simulation Results 
Base case assumptions reflect those likely to have existed in the Upper Midwest during
the mid 1990s.  This is a game with four bidders, each having a mean valuation of $150/car and
the standard deviation for each bidder of $50/car.  Results for the base model simulations are
shown in Table 2.1.  Results are symmetric across bidders.  The equilibrium bid is $131.66, the
probability of winning is .125,   and the profit if a bidder wins would be $18.34/mt.  The
17
expected profit would be $2.29/mt.
18
Table 2.1.  Equilibrium Bids, Probability of Winning, and Expected
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Equilibrium Bid $131.66 $131.66 $131.66 $131.66
Probability of Winning   .13 .13 .13 .13
Expected Profit for Shippers $2.29 $2.29 $2.29 $2.29
A graphical depiction of these results is shown in Figure 2.1.  Results demonstrate that
with higher bids, the probability of winning increases, but the profits associated with winning
diminish.  In fact, for bids above $150/car, the expected profit would be negative.  These latter







































Actual Profit Probability of Winning Expected Profit
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Figure 2.1.   Relationship Among Bid Price, Probability of Winning, and Actual and
Expected Profit.
Deviations From the Base Case.  We used the model to simulate deviations from the
base case to illustrate effects of critical variables on the solution.  Important elements of contract
design can be identified from these results.  Results are shown in Figures 2.2-2.4 and Tables 2.2
and 2.3.  
• An increase in the number of independent bidders results in more intensive competition
among bidders (Figure 2.2).  An increase in the number of bidders has the effect of
increasing the equilibrium bid (and therefore railroad profit) and decreasing the expected
profit for the bidders.    
• Bidders with higher values of GFCS will bid higher amounts and have a higher
probability of winning than those with lower valuations (Figure 2.3, Table 2.2).
• All bidders have an expected value of the GFCS, about which they have some
uncertainty, which is represented by the standard deviation.  This could occur due to the
variables on the right-hand side of equation 1.5, most notable being the subjective
probability of car shortages and demurrage costs.  This particular parameter reflects the
information relative to competitors.  Results indicate that increases in the standard
deviation result in lower bids and higher expected profits (Figure 2.4, Table 2.3).  Thus,
bidders who have greater uncertainty about competitors protect themselves by reducing
their bids; and if they win, their profits are greater.  For example, in Table 2.3, Player 4
has the highest standard deviation for his expectation of competitors costs.  Therefore,
players 1-3 take the strategic action of bidding a little more with the effect of winning
more often.  Player 4 reduces his bid in reference to his costs, such that, for the few times
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Figure 2.2.  Equilibrium Bids and Expected Profit for Shippers with Changes in Number of
Players in Bidding Game.
Figure 2.3.  Relationship Among Mean Value, Equilibrium Bids, and Expected Profit for 
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Figure 2.4.  Relationship Among Standard Deviation of Bids, Equilibrium Bids, and
Expected Profit for Shippers in a 4-player Game.
Table 2.2.  Asymmetric Valuations:  4-player Bidding Game
Value of GFCS Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Mean $140 $145 $150 $155
Std. Deviation $50 $50 $50 $50
Equilibrium Bid $121.96 $126.79 $131.61 $136.43
Probability of
Winning .12 .12 .13 .13
Expected Profit
for Shippers $2.15 $2.24 $2.34 $2.4417
Table 2.3.  Asymmetric Distribution of Valuation:  4-player Bidding Game
Value of GFCS Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Mean $150 $150 $150 $150
Std. Deviation $40 $45 $50 $55
Equilibrium Bid $134.40 $133.12 $131.80 $130.46
Probability of
Winning .15 .13 .12 .11
Expected Profit
for Shippers $2.32 $2.23 $2.17 $2.14
Summary and Discussion
Some important changes have evolved in the grain shipping industry, escalating the
sophistication of the strategic analysis of rail shipping strategies.  Most important has been the
development of guaranteed forward (GFCS) options.  While these are common in other service
industries, they are innovative in rail grain shipping which for many decades primarily used first-
order first-serve systems to allocate service, resulting in persistent shortages felt similarly across
all shippers.  An important characteristic of previous schemes was that generally shippers had
only one option; and, as a result, all shippers were treated similarly.  As a result though, demands
for shipping options may have existed, the lack of mechanisms being offered by railroads
inhibited the ability of shippers from pursuing strategies.  
These forward guaranteed service options were initially integrated into the BN system
which had to withstand commercial, political, and legal challenges.  Most of the other major rail
carriers have since introduced similar mechanisms.  Some of the common features of these are
they are for forward shipping positions, railroads provide guarantees, most are executed using an
auction process and are transferable, and shippers are subject to cancellation penalties.  Taken
together, these have enabled shippers and carriers to have irrevocable commitments about
forward shipments.  Transferability has allowed for the inception of a market for forward rail 
freight which has evolved as an important element of the industry.  
This paper explored some of the economic implications of these mechanisms.  Pricing
and distributional efficiency were described in the context of rail grain shipping.  Generally,
these mechanisms have a tendency to be more efficient from a pricing perspective by reflecting
the value of forward guaranteed shipments to both railroads who can respond in their car supply
and shippers in making procurement and shipping decisions.  Also, these mechanisms are more
allocatively efficient because shippers with the greatest valuation are capable of gaining priority
in the allocation process.18
A model was developed to identify factors determining the value of the GFCS.  The
results indicated that the value of GFCS increases with 1) increases in the probability of not
receiving cars on the want date under alternatives, 2) increases with the degree of inversion in the
commodity market, and 3) increases in time-dependent storage costs and 4) margin differentials
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed shipments.  The demand for GFCS is comprised of both
speculative and hedging components.  The former arises if traders expect shipping costs to
increase.  The latter is attributable to providing security about future shipping requirements.  Of
particular importance is these components of demand and factors determining the value of GFCS
vary both through time, as well as across shippers.
For various reasons, the railroads use auctioning mechanisms to allocate GFCS.  The
most important is that the value of GFCS is not known by the railroad.  As a result of this
asymmetric information, auctioning is an efficient mechanism at trying to extract information
from bidders, in this case, about the value of GFCS.  A game theory model of a sealed bid
auction was developed to explore some of the implications of these mechanisms on the
formulation of strategies and the effect of critical variables.  The results indicate equilibrium bids
and strategies for shippers and can be used to evaluate effects of critical variables.  There are two
effects of particular interest.  One is that an increase in the number of bidders results in more
intense bidding competition, raising equilibrium bids and reducing shippers’ expected payoffs.  
The second is that an increase in the standard deviation of information about valuations has the
effect of reducing equilibrium bids. Shippers subject to greater uncertainty protect themselves by
reducing their bids; and if they win, their profits are greater.  
Although these are analytical results, they do provide some important conclusions
regarding design and operations of a GFCS in the rail shipping industry. These innovations have
some important implications for the grain handling industry.  First,  now shippers have service
options which allow them to formulate strategies to manage their risks associated with grain
shipping.  Since each shipper may adopt different strategies at different costs, it will be less
common for shippers to have identical shipping rates (equal to tariffs).  Related to this is that
since the factors affecting the values of GFCS vary across shippers, there will be important
differences in bidding and use of these mechanisms across originators and receivers.  Second, use
of these mechanisms requires shippers to analyze factors affecting the value of the GFCS, not
only for their own operations, but also for that of their competitors, as well as evaluation of
competitor bidding and rail shipping strategies.  This includes primarily expected values of the
variables that determine the value of GFCS.  Those shippers with greater informational
advantages will have a greater advantage in bidding.  The third implication is that increasingly,
the importance of being a low cost handler will become apparent.  Handlers with lower costs will
have greater valuations of forward guaranteed service which would instill advantages to them in
terms of bidding.  
There are also some important implications for railroads in design of these mechanisms.
It is important that one of the primary reasons to use an auction is due to asymmetric information
and for the seller to extract information from potential bidders.  An important implication for
railroads is that the number of bidders is critical in terms of providing competition.  These results
indicate that the GFCS should be designed to have at least 5-6 independent bidders on a regular
basis.  If the number of bidders is less, their bids will be less, profits greater, and railroad profitsAn interesting example of this is the BN ACRES program in which shippers have equal access to large
19
amounts of information (e.g., expected fill dates, COTs sold/remaining, etc.) all of which can be used by shippers to
assess their future values of guaranteed shipments.  The BN and UP have each recently adapted the Internet as the
mode of communicating the auction and bidding information.
19
less.  Second, information is critical.  In fact, the reason for having an auction, in part, is to
extract information from shippers regarding their valuations of forward guaranteed shipments. 
These results suggest that every effort to reduce this uncertainty should be made to provide
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